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Abstract
Purpose
The present study aims to investigate the relationship between auditor tenure and stock return
volatility and to study the moderating effect of auditor’s industry specialization on this
relationship in the firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE).
Design/methodology/approach
A sample of 95 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange during the period 2011 to 2015
was selected and two hypotheses were formulated and analyzed using multivariate regression
and econometric models.
Findings
The results of the study indicate that with the increase of auditor tenure, the volatility of stock
returns is reduced. However, the results showed that the use of auditors specializing in the
client's industry does not affect the relationship between the length of auditor tenure and the
volatility of stock returns.
Originality/value
The findings of current study not only extend the extant theoretical literature concerning the
stock price volatility in developing countries including emerging capital market of Iran, but also
help investors, capital market and audit profession regulators to make informed decisions.
JEL Classification: M42, M48.
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1. Introduction
Firm-specific information is conveyed to financial markets by Stock prices. In this regard, Roll
(1988) states that a great amount of the inconsistency in stock returns can be informed by firmspecific information. Firm-specific information is composed of public information, for example,
financial reporting, which is straightforwardly included in stock prices, and private information,
which is accumulated by investors and therefore included in stock prices through cognizant
business (Su et al., 2016). Although auditors are prominent in the production of trustworthy
financial reports, unexpectedly few studies have scrutinized auditors’ impact on stock price
idiosyncratic volatility. For example, the first empirical evidence on the role of auditors in stock
price idiosyncratic volatility is presented by Gul, Kim, and Qiu (2010). They confirm that, in the
Chinese market, stock price idiosyncratic volatility is augmented by international Big 4 auditors.
Based on the literature available, with the increase of auditor tenure, because of auditor's
familiarity and better understanding of the business operations, accounting systems and reporting
issues and thus, the improvement of audit quality, the quality of companies’ financial reporting
and audited financial statements is increased.Therefore, investors, will have less uncertainty in
investment decisions and in forecasting returns, which will, in turn, reduce the volatility of stock
returns (Su et al., 2016). In addition, recent empirical evidence (Stanley & Deseret, 2007; Lim
and Tan, 2010) shows that the use of auditors specializing in the client's industry, enhances the
relationship between the length of auditor tenure and the quality of financial
reporting. However, this issue has been overlooked in most Iranian Studies, and there is a gap in
accounting and auditing literature which is the motive for this study. Hence, this study sought to
answer these questions: firstly, is there a significant relationship between the length of auditor
tenure and stock returns volatility? Secondly, can the use of auditors specializing in industry
influence this relationship? While the findings of the present study can extend the theoretical
principles of the previous research, they can also be used by investors and capital market
participants, auditing market regulators and other users of accounting information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section contains a brief description of
Auditing in Iran. Section 3 includes the review of relevant literature and states the main research
hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data selection procedure and provides details on the
methodological framework of this paper. Section 5 illustrates the empirical results and, finally,
the last section is dedicated to concluding remarks.
2. The History of Auditing in Iran
The first time thatauditingwas taken into consideration in Iranian laws dates back to the year
1932 when the Trade Law was ratified. Through this law, the general assembly of each
corporation was instructed to select one or more auditors from its own shareholders, or from
outside their organization, so that the selected auditor, through auditing the accounts and
sourcedocuments, should present a report about the firm's general conditions and also about the
financial statements prepared by management to the general assembly of owners. Though based
on the above necessity, it was the duty of the general assembly of firms, which were seemingly
established in the form of corporations after this law was ratified, to select one or more “auditor”
to do the auditing of their firms, the performance of auditing by professionally qualified and
registerd auditors as would be recognized in most developed economies, did not really occur at
this point.
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The law for using the services of competent accountants for the auditing of tax was first
proposed in the income tax law of 1949. Despite the existence of this clear and obvious legal
decision to form and establish a professional source for accounting, no noticeable steps were
taken. After the law of direct taxes was passed in 1966, the assembly of faithful auditors nearly
lost their legal support. Based on this law, a ''Center for Formal Accountants'' should first be
established before formal accountants are appointed and introduced. Rules for how to select
formal accountants were ratified in 1967 and the Center's articles were passed in 1972, after
which formal accountants took the responsibility of auditing the account books, profit and loss
statements, and the balance sheet of challengers (companies who challenged or appealed against
their tax assessment) after their tax was levied, in referring cases. In conjunction with the
performance of deeds regarding the development of a professional system of accountants for
using the services of specialized accountants in tax auditing cases, the Ammendment to Trade
Law (regarding corporations), was ratified in 1968. This ammendmentobliged Public
Corporations to add the statement of formal accountants to the firm's statement of profit and loss
and its balance sheet. Consequently, the issue of auditing public corporations found a place in
Trade Law. Nevertheless, the assumption was that the duties of auditing and legal auditors were
distinct and separable. However, due to the fact that the responsibilities for auditing predicted in
the amendment to Trade Law was put on the shoulders of formal accountants, in most
corporations some qualifiedaccountants are selected to work as legal auditors and simultaneously
undertake these two seemingly distinct responsibilities. Between 1966 and 1978, some other
laws were also ratified with respect to auditing and auditing institutes. These laws made auditing
obligatory. For instance, based on the regulations of the Tehran Stock Exchange, only the stocks
of firms whose accounts are audited by auditing institutes accepted by the Stock Allowance
Board are approved for listing.
In 1983, the topic for the combination of auditing institutes in the general sector was proposed
and the Law for the establishment of an Auditing Organization was ratified. After the legal
articles of the Auditing Organization were ratified in 1987, the auditing institutes existing in the
public sector were combined (merged) to form the so-called ''Auditing Organization''. In 1993,
the law for "using the services of specialists and competent professionals as formal accountants"
was passed in the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Based on this law, government is allowed
utilize the services of formal accountants when needed. In the above law, it is predicted that for
the arrangement of affairs and promoting the professions of accounting and auditing, and also in
order to have supervision for what formal accountants do, the institute of Iran's "Formal
Accountants community" should be established. In early 1996, for the execution of regulations
passed to assign the qualification of formal accountants, the Minister of Finance and Economy
introduced a ten-member board, seven of whom were responsible for determining appropriate
qualifications for formal accountants. The remaining three members were delegated to work as
the first formal accountants and constitutional board of Iran's Formal Accountants Community.
They were asked to prepare the Articles of the above-mentioned Community within six months
to refer to cabinet members for final ratification. The articles were arranged as determined and
the rule was ratified by cabinet members in 1999. Moreover, in 1999, regulations for how to use
the services and statements of formal accountants and auditing institutes were scrutinized. To
this end, the laws of using the services of specialists and qualified professionals as formal
accountants were compiled by the Ministry of Finance and Economy, with the association of a
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group of experts and other authorities. Then, the compliled regulations were presented to the
honorable members of cabinet for final ratification, which occurred in 2000.
3. Theoretical Foundations and Hypothesis Development
In line with the extension of competition in the audit profession, audit firms have found the need
to providing high quality services. In order to compete on a basis other than remuneration, audit
firms are looking to differente their services from their competitors. One of the aspectswheret
audit firms are trying to distinguish themselves from other institutions is the quality of audit
services provided (Su et al., 2016). Audit quality is a concept for which different definitions have
been provided. DeAngelo (1981) defines the quality of an audit based on two possibilities: First,
can the auditor detect important misstatements in the client’s accounting system? Secondly, can
the auditor report the misstatements? The possibility that the auditor can detect important
misstatements depends on the auditor's competence, and the possibility that the auditor reports
the important misstatements discovered, depends on the auditor's independence (Pauline, 2007).
Since audit quality is not directly visible, different criteria for measuring it have been
introduced. Among these criteria, auditor tenure and auditor’s specialization in industry can be
referred to as “specialization” (Symonic & Stein, 1996; Su et al., 2016).
3.1 Auditor Tenure

There are two important theories about auditor tenure. The first one states that auditor tenure
gradually reduces auditor independence, which, in turn, can result in the auditor losing
motivation and the fading of the auditor's focus on audit objectives. This would consequently,
ruin audit quality (Gal et al., 2007). On the other hand, opponents of auditor’s independence
reduction believe that with the lengtheningof auditor tenure, the auditor will be able to gain
better knowledge and experience regarding their clients, and therefore, this experience may
enhance audit quality (Manry et al. 2008).
Based on the above reasoning, Pierre and Anderson (1984) found that the probability of lawsuits
against auditors increases in the early years of their auditing work. Johnson et al (2002) also
showed that discretionary accruals during the early years of auditing tenure are higher than
towards the end of an auditor’s tenure. Walker et al (2001) also concluded that the audit failure
rate is less wherever there is a long connection between auditor and employer. Gall et al (2009)
showed that earnings quality in the early years of the audit tenure is low. Nagy and Karselo
(2004) found that the risk of fraudulent reporting in the early years of auditor tenure is higher.
In addition, Gall et al (2010) found that companies which are audited by higher quality audit
firms, experience lower volatility in their stock returns. Similarly, Su et al (2016) also
demonstrated that with the increase of auditor tenure, because of auditor's familiarity and better
understanding of the business operations, accounting systems and reporting issues improved, and
thus, there was an improvement of audit quality. The quality of companies’ financial reporting
and audited financial statements wass enhanced and, therefore, investors will experience less
uncertainty in investment decisions and forecasting return with long auditor tenure, which in
turn, reduces the volatility of stock returns. Therefore, the first hypothesis is as follows:
H1: there is a significant negative relationship between auditor tenure and the volatility of stock
returns.
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3.2 Auditor’s Industry Expertise

In addition to the length of auditor tenure, auditor industry specialization is one of the criteria
that is widely used in the literature to assess the quality of the audit. Industry expertise is meant
to be the experience and operational and educational skills achieved through auditing in a
particular industry; this knowledge, increases the probability of detection of important errors and
misstatements in the financial statements by auditors (Luvenson et al., 2007; Wise & Omari,
2010). Krishnan (2003) examined the relationship between auditor’s industry specialization and
discretionary accruals and found a negative relationship between these two variables. Also,
Choueir (2002) showed that firms audited by auditors specializing in industry have lower levels
of information asymmetry. Fernando et al (2010) believed that auditors specializing in
employers’ industries, have considerable awareness and insight regarding business operations,
and accounting procedures in the industry that enabled them to present higher quality audit
services to the client. Based on this reasoning, Stanley and Desert (2007) and Lim and Tan
(2010) found that the use of auditors specializing in the client's industry, enhances the
relationship between the length of auditor tenure and the quality of financial
reporting. Similarly, Su et al (2016) also provided evidence that the auditor’s industry expertise
affects the relationship between auditor tenure and the volatility stocks. Accordingly, the second
hypothesis is formulated as follows:
H2: using auditors specializing in the client's industry moderates the relationship between
auditor tenure and the volatility of stock returns.
3.3. Literature Review

Myers et al. (2003) in their study, in 1999 to 2002-, examined 255 companies. they showed that
long-term cooperation between the auditor and the client reduces the dispersion in the
distribution of discretionary accruals. Gal et al (2009) scrutinized the relationship between
auditor tenure and the quality of their audit. They concluded that the relationship between shorter
tenure and earnings quality is much weaker when the audit is conducted by an auditor who is
expert in the industry. Gal et al (2010) examined the impact of Ownership Structure and audit
quality on stock price volatility in Chinese companies. They selected a sample of 1142 Chinese
companies from 1996 to 2003. The results showed that by increasing foreign ownership and
audit quality, the volatility of stock prices declines. Lim and Tan (2010) studied the moderating
effect of auditor's industry expertise on the relationship between auditor tenure and audit
quality. The sample included 12,783 companies between 2000 and 2005. In this study, accruals
quality was used to evaluate the audit quality. The results showed that the use of auditors
specializing in industry enhanced the relationship between auditor tenure and audit quality.
Ragupal and Vnkatachalam (2011) assessed the effect of the quality of financial reporting on the
volatility of stock returns. The results demonstrated that the quality of financial reporting,
reduces the volatility of stock returns. Kurnyady et al (2014) studied the relationship between
corporate governance quality and the volatility of stock returns in the Capital Market of New
Zealand. The sample consisted of 385 companies in the years 2004 to 2008.
Using multiple regression models, their findings indicated that companies with higher quality
corporate governance experienced less volatility of stock returns. Su et al (2016) examined the
relationship between auditor tenure and companies’ stock return volatility and the impact of
auditor industry specialization on the relationship between them, in a sample of 19,259
companies in the US Exchange Market between the years 2003 to 2012. The results showed that
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there is a significant negative relationship between the length of auditor tenure and the volatility
of stock returns. In addition, they found that the use of auditors specializing in the client's
industry intensified the relationship between the length of auditor tenure and the volatility of
stock returns. Hassas Yeganeh et al, (2012 or 1391 in Iran’s calendar) examined the effect of
auditor industry specialization in 117 companies listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange during the
period of (Iranian calendar) 1380 to 1389. The results showed that there is no significant
difference between the content of accrual and cash components of earnings in companies with
auditors specializing in industry and that of other companies. Vakili Fard and Mehran Jouri
(2014 or in Iranian format, 1393) scrutinized the relationship between auditor tenure and
conservative accounting in a sample of 49 companies in the Tehran Stock Exchange during the
period 1385 to 1389. The results of the research hypothesis suggests that there is a significant
positive relationship between auditor tenure and accounting conservatism in all companies
investigated.
4. Methodology
4-1-Sample selection

The statistical population is composed of all companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange
from 2011 to 2015. The Sample includes all companies that have the following conditions:
- Companies whose incurred date at the Tehran Stock Exchange was before the end of the
2011 and were in the list until the end of 2015.
- To enhance comparability, the company's fiscal year must be ended in December.
- Their financial year and activities were not changed during the mentioned period.
- They must not be among investment and intermediation firms (investment companies
were not placed in the population of the present study due to the differences in the nature
of their activities).
- The duration of the interruption of trading in the company must not be more than 6
months during the mentioned period.
After applying the above limitations, 95 companies were selected as the sample of this study.
4-2-Variables measurement

In order to test the research hypotheses, the models used by Su et al. (2016) were employed
which are adjusted according to the environmental conditions of Iran. The mentioned models are
as follows:
VOLi,t =β0+ β1 TENUREi,t+ β2 SIZEi,t + β3LEVi,t +β4 ROEi,t + β5AGEi,t+ εi,t

( 1)

VOLi,t =β0+ β1 TENUREi,t + β2 SPECi,t+ β3 TENUREi,t* SPECi,t + β4 SIZEi,t + β5LEVi,t ( 2)
+β6ROEi,t + β7AGEi,t+ εi,t
Where:
4-2-1-Dependent Variable
The dependent variable of the study is the volatility of stock returns. the standard deviation of
daily stock returns is used to measure the volatility of stock returns which is consistent with
Kurnyady et al. (2014) and Sue et al (2016). It is calculated by the following equation:
i,t

∑
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Where:
Voli, t: stock return volatility of company i in year t;
Ri: daily stock returns of company i in which if
is the final price of the day t, then:
=
: the number of days of the year for which the daily stock returns of company i is calculated.
4.2.2.Independent Variable
The independent variable of this study is auditor tenure which is measured as the number of
consecutive years of the auditor-client relationship.
4.2.3- Moderating Variable
Moderating variable used in this study, is the industry-specialist auditor (SPEC) for its
measurement the Palm Rose (1986) model was used. In this model, the institutions whose
market share (MS ) is true in the following equation are considered as industry-specialists:
where
NK: the number of firms in industry k. to measure the market share of audit firm i in industry k,
the following equation is proposed:

∑
∑

∑

where
TAi,t,k : is the total assets of client firm j in industry k which is audited by audit firm i.
i=1,2,…,I: audit firm index, j =1,2,..,J: client’s index, k =1,2,..,K: client’s industry, : number of
audit firm in industry k and : the number of clients audited by audit firm j in industry k. as
such, if the client is audited by an industry specialist audit firm, it takes the value of 1, 0
otherwise.
4.2.4- Control Variables:
Firm size (SIZE): The present research uses the log of corporate annual net sales to measure the
firm size.
Financial leverage (LEV): Financial leverage is measured as dividing total debt by total assets.
Profitability (ROE): return on equity is adopted as a measure of profitability which is calculated
by dividing net income by the market value of equity.
Firm Age (AGE): the number of years since the firm first appears in stock exchanges.
Since the panel data are superior to time-series and cross-sectional models with respect to the
number of observations, there is a low probability of collinearity among variables, bias reduction
in estimation and heterogeneity of variance (Gujarati, 2009), the multivariate regression model
based on panel data was employed to test the research hypothesis.
5- Empirical results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
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Table (1) shows the descriptive statistics, including some central tendency and dispersion
variables for a sample of 475 firm-year observation in the time period of 2011 to 2015.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics for all variables
Variables

N

Mean

Median

Minimum

Maximum

Std. Deviation

3.051
2.622
0.319
17.204
2.866
13
4.069
4.634
4
1
1
0.485
0
0.463
0
14.563
0.684
12.215
12.016
9.865
1.508
0.226
0.621
0.619
0.091
475
0.644
0.151
0.194
0.191
-0.133
ROE
475
58
9.733
42
45
14
AGE
Notes: VOL the standard deviation of daily stock returns ; TENURE - number of consecutive years of
the auditor-client relationship; SPEC - 1 if the company is audited by an industry specialist audit firm , 0
otherwise; SIZE - log of firm’s total sales; LEV- Leverage measured as the ratio of total debt to total
assets; ROE - return on equity defined as net income to market value of equity ; AGE - Firm Age.

VOL
TENURE
SPEC
SIZE
LEV

475
475
475
475
475

As seen in this figure, about 48 percent of the sample companies have been audited by the
industry-specialist auditors. In addition, on average, about 62% of the assets of the companies is
financed from debts. net income of companies is on average equivalent of 19% of market value
of their equity.
5.2. Regressions results

F-limer is first used to clarify whether the collected data are pooled or panel. According to the
results presented in table 2, the significance level of the F-limer for either models is less than
0.05. Therefore, panel data were used to estimate the research models.
Table 2 - The results of F-limer for the research models
Model
F-statistics
Result
**
11.109
panel data method
Model (1)
11.415**
panel data method
Model (2)
Notes: ** and * denote significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels,
respectively .

To explore the type of panel data (fixed or random effect methods), the Hausman test is used. As
indicated in table 3, the models have to be estimated via fixed effects method.
Model
Model (1)
Model (2)

Table 3- the results of Hausman test
Chi - Square Statistics
Result
12.793*
16.188*

Notes: ** and * denote significance at the
respectively .

fixed effects method
fixed effects method
0.01 and

0.05

levels,

Moreover, to test whether the error terms have the skewness and kurtosis matching a normal
distribution, Jarque-Bera test was used. Since the results of Jarque-Bera test for the research
models are greater than 0.05, the normal distribution of the error terms, was confirmed. The
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results of likelihood ratio (LR) test, which is conducted to examine the heteroscedasticity among
error terms, suggest a heteroscedasticity among them. To eliminate this problem, the Generalized
Least Square method was employed to estimate the research models. Also, to ensure the lack of
multicollinearity among the explanatory variables, the multicollinearity test was undertaken
using variance inflation factor (VIF). The results pointed to the lack of multicollinearity among
the mentioned variables since the values of the test were lower than 10. Finally, as indicated in
table 4, Durbin-Watson test was used to establish if there is a serial autocorrelation among the
error terms of the models. The results of testing the first hypothesis is illustrated in Table 4.
Table 4 - The Results of the First Hypothesis
Variable

Expected Sign

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

C
TENURE
SIZE
LEV
ROE
AGE

?
+
-

-0.136**
-0.093**
-0.018*
0.065**
-0.022
-0.071

0.032
0.029
0.007
0.017
0.021
0.211

-4.143
-3.256
-2.117
3.713
-1.094
-0.336

F-stat.
2

R

7.926**

Durbin-Watson stat

0.608

Adjusted R

2

1.977
0.574

Notes: ** and * denote significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. TENURE - number of consecutive
years of the auditor-client relationship; SIZE - log of firm’s total sales; LEV- Leverage measured as the ratio
of total debt to total assets; ROE - return on equity defined as net income to market value of equity ; AGE Firm Age.

The F statistic and its significance level, reflects that the fitted regression model is significant at
5 percent level. The adjusted R2 of the estimated model shows that about 57 percent of changes
in the stock return volatility is explained by the independent and control variables of the model.
In addition, the results of Durbin-Watson statistics also confirm the lack of autocorrelation
among the error terms of regression model. As indicated in the above table, the estimated
coefficient and t-statistics of the variable of TENURE are negative and significant at 0.05 level,
which shows that there is a significant negative relationship between the auditor tenure and the
volatility of stock returns. Therefore, the first hypothesis is accepted at 0.05 level. The results of
testing the second hypothesis is illustrated in Table 5.
Table 5 - The Results of the Second Hypothesis
Variable

Expected Sign

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

C
TENURE
SPEC
TENURE*SPEC
SIZE
LEV
ROE
AGE

?
+/+
-

-0.048*
-0.135**
-0.024
-0.029
-0.017*
0.055**
-0.037
-0.019

0.019
0.034
0.016
0.057
0.008
0.021
0.022
0.237

-2.442
-3.895
-1.505
-0.514
-2.031
2.757
-1.672
-0.081
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F-stat.

8.103**

Durbin-Watson stat

1.958

R2

0.624

Adjusted R2

0.595

Notes: ** and * denote significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. TENURE - number of consecutive
years of the auditor-client relationship; SPEC - 1 if the company is audited by an industry specialist audit firm ,
0 otherwise; SIZE - log of firm’s total sales; LEV- Leverage measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets;
ROE - return on equity defined as net income to market value of equity ; AGE - Firm Age.

By Looking at F statistic and its significance level, it can be found that the fitted regression
model is significant at 5 percent level. The adjusted R2 indicates that the independent and control
variables of the model explain about 59 percent of changes in the volatility of stock returns. As
seen in this table, the estimated coefficient and t-statistics relating to the interaction variable
TENURE * SPEC is positive but not statistically significant. Thus, the second hypothesis is
rejected at the 5% level.
6. Conclusion
The main objective of this study was to investigate the relationship between auditor tenure and
stock return volatility and to study the moderating effect of auditor’s industry specialization on
the relationship between them in companies listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange.
For this purpose, a sample of 95 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange during the
period 2011 to 2015 was selected and two hypotheses were formulated. The first hypothesis test
results showed that there is a significant negative relationship between auditor tenure and the
volatility of stock returns. Confirming this hypothesis illustrates that with the increase of auditor
tenure, because of auditor's familiarity with, and better understanding of, the business operations,
accounting systems and reporting issues and thus, the improvement of audit quality, the quality
of companies’ financial reporting and audited financial statements is increased. Therefore,
investors, will have less uncertainty in investment decisions and forecasting returns, which in
turn, reduces the volatility of stock returns. Results obtained in this study are in line with the
findings of Gall et al. (2010) and Sue et al (2016) in that there is a negative relationship between
the length of auditor tenure and the company’s stock return volatility. The second hypothesis
analyzed the impact of auditors specializing in clients’ industries on the relationship between
auditor tenure and the volatility of stock returns. The results of testing this hypothesis suggest
that auditor industry specialization does not have a significant effect on this relationship.
However, based on the existing theoretical foundations, it was expected that the use of auditors
specializing in the client's industry intensifies the negative relationship between the length of
auditor tenure and the volatility of stock returns. But the results did not confirm the existence of
such a relationship. The possible reasons for this would be the use of different definitions for
measuring the industry-specialist auditor in various studies. In addition, the differences between
the environment in Iran and other countries could be a possible reason for this
inconsistency. Based on the findings, it is suggested to investors and capital market participants
that in making investment decisions, besides financial variables, they pay attention to auditor
tenure as a factor affecting the volatility of stock returns. Furthermore, the framers of the
provisions of the audit market, including the Society of Certified Public Accountants and
Auditing Organization are recommended to suggest that the mandatory rotation period of audit
firms increase to 5 years or more, so that the audit quality improves and, therefore, the volatility
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of stock returns is reduced. Some of the important issues that can be examined in future research
include:
1.The moderating effect of auditor reputation on the relationship between auditor tenure with the
company’s stock return volatility.
2. The effect of the length of auditor tenure on the cost of equity.
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